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Abstract 
In this paper, the authors review documented 
problems in military intelligence that appear well suited 
for improvement via blockchain technology. We review 
guidance from the literature related to determining 
blockchain technology applicability and propose a 
decision aid tailored to military intelligence 
perspectives. We also propose applying batch queueing 
theory to enable initial feasibility studies and present 
analysis toward the first known case study of military 
intelligence incorporation of blockchain technology, a 
project reviewing blockchain applicability to an 
intelligence database that stores geographic locations 
of units of interest. 
1. Introduction 
As blockchain technology’s influence expands 
beyond the bounds of the cryptocurrency sector initially 
proposed by Nakamoto [1] in the Bitcoin white paper, 
various potential use cases for the military seem 
apparent. For example, work is well underway to see 
how it might help in additive manufacturing [2]. 
Another clear candidate is the military intelligence 
system, which comprises a wide range of networked 
processes, many of which stand to benefit from the 
immutable, decentralized ledger at blockchain 
technology’s core. Replace ledger with log, the more 
common synonymous term from military vernacular, 
and the candidate systems nominate themselves. 
Underscored by the often-discussed hype 
surrounding blockchain, we have reached the juncture 
warranting an in-depth research effort to characterize 
best-use cases and implementation practices for military 
intelligence, similar to the perspective for business 
leaders recently offered by the World Economic Forum 
(WEF) [3]. This paper will take preliminary steps 
toward military intelligence adoption of blockchain 
technology-based solutions by laying the groundwork 
for such research. Our technique is two pronged, 
focusing both on analysis of standing military 
intelligence problems and analysis of blockchain 
technology strengths to identify areas that seem well 
aligned. We also frame the path to adoption by 
proposing an approach to initial analysis of blockchain 
technology’s applicability and potential performance 
before significant investment. 
The paper is organized into four sections as follows: 
Section 2 provides brief background discussions of both 
military intelligence and blockchain technology. In 
Section 3, we review documented hurdles within the 
military intelligence enterprise that appear to be good 
candidates for blockchain technology-assisted 
improvement. Section 4 reviews the guidance toward 
applicability and feasibility determinations for potential 
use cases, presenting a draft decision-aid from a military 
intelligence perspective and proposing techniques to 
enable abstraction of the blockchain-based process for 
initial feasibility analysis. In Section 5, we describe an 
initial case study that should prove beneficial not only 
immediately to the particular case, but also to a 
generalized understanding of the path toward wider 
adoption. 
2. Background 
As characterized by the joint doctrine of the United 
States [4], the joint intelligence process “includes the 
organizations, capabilities, and processes involved in 
the collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and 
dissemination of information or finished intelligence.” 
Doctrine defines the principles of sound joint 
intelligence with vocabulary that appears to belay a 
natural pairing with blockchain technology including 
networked, decentralized, shared, distributed, 
protected, and secure. The following subsections 
provide broad background descriptions of military 
intelligence and blockchain technology to aid in 
forecasting the relationships between the two fields. 
2.1 Military intelligence  
At its core, military intelligence is similar to many 
business processes in that it is about collecting, 
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analyzing, and disseminating information to enable 
timely decision-making. Figure 1, adapted from Joint 
Publication 2-0, which sets the overarching doctrine for 
U.S. military intelligence, depicts a core tenant of 
intelligence tradecraft. All of the qualities of the 
operational environment must be winnowed down into 
the intelligence that truly matters for decision making 
on a timeline that facilitates action. To do so, the 
collection, processing and exploitation, and analysis and 
production processes must be efficient and effective at 
carrying only the relevant facts through to the next phase 
of intelligence production.  
 
Figure 1. Relationship between data, 
information, and intelligence; adapted from [4] 
 
As technology has progressed, the variety of 
resources that contribute to the intelligence process has 
grown without bound. Data sources run the gambit from 
manned and unmanned space, airborne, ground, 
maritime, and cyberspace platforms with any variety of 
sensors in play, creating a volume of data described as 
overwhelming [5]. Once collected, the data processing 
is growing increasingly sophisticated, with headline 
efforts like Project Maven working to integrate artificial 
intelligence and machine learning at a rapid pace [5]. 
Finally, delivery to the strategic, operational, and 
tactical decision makers requires robust and globally 
accessible communications infrastructure.   
These lofty requirements coupled with similar 
requirements across the realms of the Department of 
Defense are the energy behind the Defense Innovation 
Initiative and the third offset strategy outlined by 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Work in 2016, which 
entails a comprehensive effort to advance U.S. military 
capability by leveraging new technology [6]. The 
headlines on the effort have underscored artificial 
intelligence and man-machine learning, but blockchain 
technology should be right there in the research mix, 
with dedicated efforts working to distinguish hyperbole 
from opportunity. 
2.2 Blockchain technology  
Blockchain technology, the framework behind the 
cryptocurrency boom, offers a mechanism for securely 
storing and adding to a body of collective knowledge in 
a distributed manner. Although there are variations, 
most blockchain implementations operate as follows, 
summarized and adapted from references [1], [7], [8], 
and [9]: Time-stamped and chronologically ordered 
transactions are grouped into units called blocks. The 
first entry in the next block in the chain will be its 
predecessor’s cryptographic hash value, thus linking the 
series of blocks into a chain. That cascading 
cryptography prevents any single block in the chain 
from being altered without simultaneous updates to all 
subsequent blocks.   
Additionally, many users store the chain in a 
decentralized manner so that any changes would also 
have to occur simultaneously at each of those locations. 
If differing copies of a chain begin to circulate in the 
network, the discrepancy is usually solved based on one 
of three consensus schemes:  proof-of-work (POW), 
proof-of-stake (POS), or round robin.    
In POW, each block also includes an additional 
value called the nonce, which is selected to ensure that 
the complete block, when hashed, will produce a value 
with a particular pattern, often some set number of 
leading zero bits. Nodes hunting for these desirable 
nonce values are called miners. When a miner uncovers 
a new nonce value and completes a block, the miner 
broadcasts that block out to all other miners who append 
the chain and begin work on the next block. Because the 
nonce discovery is computationally expensive, any 
discrepancies in copies of the chain, i.e., forks in the 
chain, resolve by using the longest available copy of the 
chain, as it represents the preponderance of available 
computational power and thus the consensus of the 
network. In a currency setting, miners are rewarded with 
coins upon their blocks’ acceptance to incentivize 
participation.  
In POS, the network users who hold the most stake 
in the network hold the power to determine consensus. 
In cryptocurrency applications, this stake equates to 
how many coins the user already holds, thus placing the 
most trust in those who stand to lose the most if the 
cryptocurrency is untrustworthy. Each user wishing to 
add a block to the chain is racing to find a nonce value 
that produces a hash within a range of values 
proportional to how much stake they have in the 
network. The more stake, the easier it becomes to find a 
nonce value, and the more likely it becomes that 
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particular user’s block is the one added to the chain. If 
the blockchain forks, the longest chain will represent the 
opinion of the greatest stakeholders, thus fit the 
consensus definition of the POS network. 
Both schemes grew in cryptocurrency based public 
blockchain models, so monetary incentive made sense 
in the absence of trust. For applications where some 
level of trust does exist, round robin consensus models 
are also in use, where nodes simply take turns adding 
the next block to the chain.  
Blockchain categorization includes permissionless 
and permissioned models. Most of the discussion thus 
far has broadly described the original, permissionless 
model proposed by Nakamoto [1] in which any user can 
read and write to the chain. The hallmark of the model 
is the complete lack of required trust or central 
authority, with even the software of the chain itself 
abiding by public consensus. Permissioned or privatized 
blockchains maintain the shared distributed ledger but 
control who can read and write to the ledger in 
accordance with centrally applied policy. Easier mining 
processes usually mark permissioned blockchains 
because the miners are from a trusted subset of users, 
which may add vulnerability to the system, for example, 
if any of the trusted subset choose to act maliciously. 
3. Potential application areas 
As with any new technology, but particularly one 
that has achieved these significant levels of hype, there 
is significant likelihood for mis- and over-application in 
the eager, early days, as recent publications have warned 
[10]. To prevent such error, it is important to ensure that 
we pull test cases from a list of relevant problems that 
need solved, rather than from processes that work fine, 
but appear blockchain-ready. Though there are certainly 
other documented issues, three themes that consistently 
appear in recent military intelligence official statements 
and trade publications relate to modernizing the 
intelligence system in response to overwhelming 
volumes of incoming data [5], supporting distributed 
and decentralized capability [11], and ethical 
accountability requirements [12].   
3.1 Big data 
As data sources diversify, questions of the validity 
and accuracy of incoming data arise. Carefully 
implemented, blockchain technology might enable us to 
weed out data from mis-calibrated sensors or even 
deceptive adversary activity. As an initial validation is 
offered by Raab, et.al., [13] via a mechanism that uses 
blockchain technology to overcome global positioning 
system (GPS) spoofing. Their patent application points 
to a variety of other uses in areas with similar reliance 
on semi-public data. For maritime domain awareness 
applications, the Automated Information System (AIS) 
seems an obvious place to start.   
More data, even if all validated, does not directly 
lead to better intelligence, though. As we automate the 
initial processing, presentation, analysis, and archiving 
of information using the sophisticated techniques 
adopted under Project Maven and similar efforts, our 
human power is free to focus on actually understanding 
information and transitioning it to meaningful 
intelligence [5]. Yet there remains a significant 
impediment to the adoption of automated learning into 
the intelligence process: the black-box nature of 
algorithm-based processes makes it difficult for some 
commanders to trust intelligence based on the results. 
Here again, blockchain technology offers potential 
solutions. 
 
 
Figure 2. A blockchain technology use case 
for preserving the providence of tasking-to-
decision processes 
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First, it may offer a new mechanism to trace 
assessments back to data, preserving a dissectible path. 
From the realm of academia, Extance describes how the 
science community is eagerly looking to this technology 
to “enhance reproducibility and the peer review process 
by creating incorruptible data trails” in scientific 
research [14]. In a related use case, blockchain based 
solutions are being incorporated into various supply 
chains in hopes of adding accountability and 
transparency to historically cloudy products such as 
diamonds [15].  
For intelligence, the providence of both information 
and assessment could be preserved for the decision 
maker at the far end. Blockchain technology 
implemented to preserve data/assessment connections 
also significantly enhances our ability to corral 
assessments later found to be incorrect, preventing a 
false assessment from one watch floor from continuing 
to replicate through the products of others. The 
preliminary entities involved in such a system are 
presented in Figure 2.  
Similar to the black box navigation recorders in 
ships and aircraft, the system would create an audit trail 
of the intelligence support to a given military decision 
by linking the initial legal and justified collection 
priorities to the sensor tasking, raw data collection, 
automated or human-powered analysis, and finished 
products that were presented before a decision was 
made. Well integrated, the system should be persistent 
and nearly transparent so that the records exist before 
we know the magnitude of the decision, as this is an 
environment where seemingly inconsequential 
decisions can have life or death consequences. 
Such a system might also help us develop better ties 
between analysts at disparate organizations who could 
benefit from one another’s work. The same blockchain 
technology will allow us to follow a single analyst’s 
workflow in a new, more detailed way, termed “cyber 
profiling” by Ford, et. al., in a recent patent filing [16]. 
We can cross-pollinate based on patterns of intelligence 
analysis beyond the traditional lines of regional 
expertise by discerning multiple other traits from the 
immutable record of the analysis process.    
Also picking away at the black box of algorithm-
based processes, the innovative concept of smart 
contracting, which hinges on blockchain technology, 
has the potential to implement policy meaningfully into 
intelligence processes [7]. Meaningful in that we verify 
compliance with set policy without the need for an 
independent team of trusted lawyer-engineers capable 
of policing complex and evolving systems. Smart 
contracts act as a virtual inspector, checking new blocks 
in the chain against acceptable standards for data 
confidence level, data timeliness, or nearly anything 
else that a specific application requires. 
3.2 Distributed and decentralized access  
The final part of the modern intelligence system is 
the availability of access to both raw data and finished 
intelligence in real-time and on-demand from anywhere. 
A unit’s ability to dynamically self-determine which 
information and intelligence is most relevant to the 
current mission will be critical to enabling force-
multiplying dynamic employment options.  
Ever evolving adversaries in cyberspace [17], 
however, influence our ability to adopt the easiest 
solutions for distributed access. Cyber vulnerability 
vectors increase as access points to a network increase, 
giving adversaries more opportunity to disrupt, deny, 
and degrade the intelligence process. Here again, 
blockchain technology offers an advantage in 
overcoming some cyber vulnerabilities. The 
sophistication, computational requirement, and number 
of attack vectors required to mount an impactful attack 
against a blockchain is withering. Especially, when we 
look at the opportunities to use blockchains to protect 
not just databases but computer software itself, 
extending and expanding from the additive 
manufacturing study previously mentioned [2], 
rendering it far more difficult to insert malicious code.  
There is also strong initial evidence that blockchain 
based systems can contribute to malicious node 
detection schemes in small scale and relatively simple 
network environments [18].  Such an application might 
be beneficial immediately in similarly small-scale 
sensor networks, with interesting but yet uncertain 
potential applications in networks of larger scale and 
complexity.  
Finally, there is promising research into blockchain 
technology’s ability to enable decentralized artificial 
intelligence for the first time [7]. Rather than a single 
super computer sharing results with many watch floors, 
each intelligence center contributes to the process. The 
primary advantage to this is that the calculations 
necessary for sophisticated artificial intelligence 
processes distribute across the computational resources 
of all participants, preventing the need for significant 
investment in a single highly capable site and redundant 
backups. With distribution, as long as enough other 
participants maintain computational capability, graceful 
degradation might be possible.  
3.3 Ethical accountability   
As distribution gives more users access to sensitive 
data, ethical considerations also arise. Our intelligence 
apparatus must be able to assure a concerned public that 
we are working for justifiable military intelligence 
purposes. Here again both the cyber behavior profile and 
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data-to-analysis blockchain previously discussed 
protect a more auditable record of intelligence activity. 
Returning to the cyber profiles from Ford, et. al., 
[16], the patent describes a mechanism for using 
blockchain technology to understand every individual’s 
unique “cyber behavior profile” by tying a complete 
history of “suspect” and “good” behavior to each of us, 
which could help prevent both the theft of credentials 
and insider threat from continuing to plague intelligence 
networks. 
4. Initial system design considerations 
As the hype around blockchain settles, many efforts 
are underway to help potential adopters decide whether 
blockchain technology is right for them. The following 
subsections present two paths to helping make that call. 
First, we survey guidance from literature regarding 
blockchain technology applicability for the points most 
pertinent to military intelligence applications.   Second, 
we propose using queueing theory to do initial 
feasibility analysis to ensure blockchain technology is 
capable of meeting system performance requirements. 
4.1 Military intelligence-specific guidance 
We surveyed seven examples of guidance 
regarding blockchain applicability for points that would 
need to be included, expanded, or deleted in our draft 
framework tailored for military intelligence use 
[19],[20],[21],[22],[23],[15],[3]. Although vocabulary 
varied, there were several dominant considerations that 
most of the authors included, as tallied in Table 1. 
Six of the seven models focus on identifying 
problems for which blockchain in not well suited by 
offering disqualifying criteria or a flow chart with many 
ramps toward disqualification. At this early juncture, for 
our models, we have made efforts to balance avoidance 
of false application to problems not well matched to 
distributed ledger solutions with a desire to be flexible 
enough to explore new potential.  As such, the key 
mandatory quality we have identified at this juncture is 
that the process must be collaborative in nature, which 
many of the authors filed under shared control.  One 
example of flexibility in potential employment came 
from the model put forward by Peck [19], which 
suggests that even in the presence of other disagreeable  
 
Table 1. Trends in specific consideration points regarding blockchain applicability, highlighted 
columns indicate those of particular interest in military intelligence applications 
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Greenspan [19] Blockchain Development C 15 X X X      X X X  X    X   
Birch, Brown, Parulava  
[20] Finance F 16          X X X     X   
Meunier [21] Blockchain Development C 16  X  X X  X X  X X  X X X     
Lewis [22] Blockchain Development C 17  X X      X  X         
Peck [23] Electrical Engineering F 17 X   X   X   X   X X   X X  
Wüst-Gervais [15] Computer Science F, C 17  X X X      X   X X   X   
Mulligan [3] Finance F 18  X  X X X X X   X X X X  X X  X 
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factors blockchain technology may be worth 
considering in cases where the database is likely to be 
attacked, pointing to the previously discussed potential 
for blockchain technology to help overcome cyber 
vulnerabilities related to centralized services and single 
points of failure. This is of particular interest to military 
intelligence where some systems must actually be 
optimized for performance in the worst case, wartime 
scenario when cyber, electromagnetic, and physical 
attacks attempt to disrupt system operations as this is 
when they will be needed most. Thus, for critical 
functions, it can be worth investigating new technology 
enhancements even when requirements are currently 
met by more established technology.  
To expand on this point for our purposes, we 
suggest careful consideration of whether the mitigation 
is capable of enabling the overarching process. For 
example, if distributed access is partially cut off or 
partitioned in a blockchain based system, the blockchain 
might continue to operate but would fork in each of the 
isolated networks. Although resolution is possible upon 
full system restoration, the implications of such forks in 
context of the service the ledger provides matter. It is 
not enough to give users the appearance of system 
durability during attack without the ledger actually 
continuing to enable the intended process.   
The next consideration relates to how the 
collaboration unfolds.  The literature highlights that 
optimal blockchain employment is in database systems 
with strong interactions or interdependencies between 
entries, as in the cryptocurrency that changes hands 
during a transaction. We highlight this to help 
intelligence system designers think about how a system 
of interest might be abstracted into a series of 
interrelated transactions and how that might help solve 
a performance or reliability issue. 
Many of the models also attempt at least a 
preliminary handling of blockchain permission models 
so that if blockchain is assumed to be applicable, the a 
recommendation is given as to which permission model   
best fits a given problem [21]. Leveraging the advice 
given, we broadly discard the permissionless blockchain 
model for military applications as a fully public shared 
ledger has no obvious use in intelligence processes.   
We absorbed both of the types of permissioned 
models given in the taxonomy by BPP, as there are 
likely to be both the permissioned and double 
permissioned applications [21].  For example, a raw 
intelligence data collection database, which takes input 
from a wide variety of sources and sensors, results in 
shared integrity contribution by all users while finished 
intelligence analysis databases are accessed by many, 
with the integrity maintained by only a few deputized 
experts. 
Other considerations that carry over and even gain 
emphasis in a heavily hierarchical system like the 
military are the considerations of how chain of 
command and regulation impact the ability to “turn 
over” certain system controls to a decentralized service. 
Smart contracts may offer a mechanism for overcoming 
apparent disconnects, but it is still an important 
consideration even from the earliest design phases. If 
decentralization is not congruent with applicable 
command philosophy, i.e., the central figure in charge 
of the process wants to retain complete control, 
blockchain technology may not be the path to problem 
solving. 
 
Figure 3. Critical factors in determining when 
blockchain technology might apply to military 
intelligence processes. 
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Applying these basic adjustments as a lens, we 
propose the check list in Figure 3 to military intelligence 
process owners considering adoption of blockchain 
technology. If a system meets the first, mandatory tenet 
identified in bold and at least one of the others, it may 
be a reasonable candidate for a permissioned blockchain 
technology model. It represents a draft that will continue 
to evolve over the course of research. 
Figure 3 is qualitative in nature. As research 
continues, we will pursue more quantitative measures to 
understand the specific tipping points in various factors 
including network overhead, computational 
requirements, and system robustness. The next section 
describes our effort to move toward that quantitative 
analysis. 
4.2 Feasibility analysis via batch queues  
To aid with initial system design, it is helpful to 
abstract above the blockchain, examining how it will fit 
into the wider system model. We propose applying 
batch queueing theory to understand how the 
blockchain-based portion of a process will perform. In 
the subsequent discussion, we will follow standard 
queueing notation, A/B/X, wherein A denotes 
interarrival-time distribution, B denotes service-time 
distribution and X denotes the number of service 
providers. Essentially, the blockchain-based process is a 
black box that accepts incoming transactions and 
performs the service of incorporating those transactions 
into a block.  
All blockchain processes will be A/B/1 processes, 
as only a single block of the chain generates at once. 
Even if multiple nodes build on blocks in parallel, the 
overall system will only keep one of these blocks as 
forks are resolved. Further, because incoming individual 
data join the chain as a batch, all blockchain processes 
will be A/BY/1 processes with the superscript Y 
denoting that service is conducted in batches of some 
size.  Working from queueing theory, we can begin to 
understand the relationship between transaction arrival 
rate and block generation rate, observing how various 
tradeoffs in encryption complexity, block size, data 
latency, and other factors will affect the process. 
As an example, because the POW difficulty alters 
in Bitcoin to maintain a constant block creation rate, 
Kawase and Kasahara [24] make a strong case for 
modeling Bitcoin as an M/GB/1 queueing service. In this 
case, Bitcoin transaction inter-arrivals are exponentially 
(M) distributed, as expected with such a large system of 
independent actors. Bitcoin service rate is generally 
distributed (G), parametrized by the set maximum block 
size, B, and the efforts to maintain constant block 
creation rates.   
Breaking apart intelligence processes, many also 
have exponentially distributed inter-arrivals, 
particularly true in the case of persistent sensors. In 
some cases, because of intermittent sensor availability, 
connectivity, or event-driven reporting, data instead 
arrive in bursts, requiring the system to handle widely 
varying arrival rates of limited predictability.  
Borrowing from Bitcoin practices, we remark that 
controlling a combination of block size and block 
creation rate will also make sense in many intelligence 
applications. First, these factors enable system designers 
to ensure that data is added to the chain with no more 
than an acceptable maximum delay, even during periods 
of unusually low activity. Further, these factors make 
network requirements more predictable to ensure that 
blockchain participants are equipped to handle the 
increased communication load necessary to participate 
in the peer-to-peer network used for transaction 
broadcast and block synchronization. This becomes 
especially important in military applications where 
communications networks often need to be flexibly able 
to operate in intermittently denied and degraded 
environments. It also makes computational 
requirements more predictable as the expected block 
size and generation rate will give us solid footing for 
understanding the cryptographic load the system will 
need to support, though this becomes less important if 
we depart from a POW model.  
As such, both M/GB/1 and GB/GB/1 systems are 
likely to fit many intelligence-related blockchain 
technology solutions. Understanding of both models is 
likely to serve analysts well in initial feasibility 
assessments for proposed blockchain technology 
systems.   
5. Preliminary analysis 
For the near term, the primary objective is to 
understand the hurdles specific to military intelligence 
adoption of this technology to ease wider adoption as 
more and more applications are developed. As the first 
known case study toward military intelligence adoption 
of blockchain technology, we are evaluating how it 
might improve an order of battle database that U.S. 
Pacific Fleet naval units use for situational awareness 
and the development of intelligence briefings. The 
research hopes to emphasize how blockchain 
technology makes this and similar systems less reliant 
on centralized data solutions. 
Generally, order of battle databases hold the latest 
available geolocation of air, surface, and subsurface 
units of interest to enable analysts to monitor changes in 
traffic patterns and understand the disposition of current 
threats. The data arrives from a multitude of intelligence 
sources, but for feasibility analysis we propose using the 
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Automated Identification System (AIS) as a starting 
point for system design because the data is publicly 
available and thus friendlier to academic research than 
other intelligence data.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Nominal blockchain-based archival 
system for AIS reports 
AIS was developed to provide ship operators with 
integrated displays of all ships within their very high 
frequency (VHF) radio range to improve safety. It is an 
especially interesting starting point for analysis of 
blockchain applications to intelligence because it 
represents a system where individual reporting units 
have no reason to trust one another, yet the majority of 
ships participate cooperatively anyway, much like the 
trust relationships that exist (or not) in cryptocurrency 
applications. 
The system is now required on almost all vessels by 
international regulation. Each vessel makes a 256-bit 
position report every 2-30 seconds depending on vessel 
class. Based on the AIS communications standard 
promulgated by the International Maritime 
Organization, the system must support reports at a 
minimum rate of 2,000 per minute, yet based on VHF 
range limitations, any one station usually sees a much 
lower report volume [25]. For a station in San Francisco 
harbor, for example, an average of 132 reports per 
minute were observed during the first week of June 2018 
with reception distance averaging 8 nautical miles [26]. 
As an experimental model, we will explore a 
blockchain-based archival system with 12 participants 
located in an area of significant traffic flow such that 
while each station may observe lower rates, the 
combined traffic interarrival rate to the blockchain-
based process can be assumed to be a Poisson random 
variable with an expected value of 25 reports per 
second. With no prioritization applied, reports are 
simply added to the next block in order of arrival as soon 
as B reports are in the queue, resulting in a batch-based 
service model following the M/GB/1 queueing model. 
Figure 4 offers a simplified diagram of the process. The 
batch processing rate must maintain an overall average 
above 25 reports per second for system stability, which 
is well within permissioned blockchain performance 
capability quantified by Pongnumkul, et. al. [27]. Thus, 
the block size and block creation rate boundaries begin 
to take shape since together they will drive overall 
system service rate.  
With preliminary analysis in hand, the next step in 
the research will be applying the existing body of 
M/GB/1 research to this model to help quantify the trade-
offs and design decision points in system performance.   
6. Conclusion  
Blockchain technology presents an interesting 
opportunity to solve some of the well documented 
problems in military intelligence systems. By drafting 
guidance toward applicability and feasibility studies, we 
hope to drive successful exploration of well-matched 
use cases both in our own research efforts and those in 
fields with similar priorities. This paper represents the 
Stations receive AIS 
reports via VHF, 
share reports with 
other stations via 
network 
Accumulated 
reports, Poisson 
arrivals with λ= 
1,500 reports/min 
Batches of n reports 
are pulled into the 
block-creation 
process 
Station completing 
the block shares 
with all stations for 
inclusion in local 
chain 
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earliest of progress in a wider and more systematic 
review of blockchain technology. As such, we present 
our research approach and justification, with much more 
to follow in subsequent works as we gain headway in 
understanding and eventually quantifying the specific 
impediments and benefits to incorporation of 
blockchain technology in military intelligence systems. 
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